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Behavior Management and Liability of
Dentists: Children and the Hand-OverMouth Exercise
Thomas Bowers*
I. Introduction
Many pedodontists and other dentists treating small children
encounter the hysterical, aggressive, or resistant child for whom
treatment is impossible unless the child's behavior is modified, the
child is restrained, or the child is sedated or anesthetized.' Faced
with such a child most pedodontists choose to modify the child's behavior by utilizing the hand-over-mouth exercise (HOM).' Other
dentists elect not to use HOM because they think its use is either
unprofessional or illegal. 3 Even dentists using HOM have lingering
* Associate Professor of Jurisprudence, Indiana University School of Dentistry;
B.S.B.A., 1974, The Ohio State University; J.D., 1977, New York University.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Donald Tharp and Dr. Paul Starkey, of the Indiana University School of Dentistry, in the preparation of this article.
1. J.C. BRAUER, W.W. DEMERITT, L.B. HIGLEY, R.L. LINDAHL, M. MASSLER, AND 1.
SHOUR, DENTISTRY FOR CHILDREN 53 (5th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as BRAUER]; R.L.
Braham, Control of Behavior and Anxiety in the Child Patient, 7 CURRENT THERAPY IN
DENTISTRY 33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Braham]; E.L. Lampshire, Control of Pain and
Comfort, 4 CURRENT THERAPY IN DENTISTRY 513 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Lampshire].
2. Association of Pedodontic Diplomates, Survey of Attitudes and Practicesin Behavior Management, 3 PEDIATR. DENT. 246, 248 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Survey of Attitudes]; Association of Pedodontic Diplomates, Techniques for Behavior Management - a
Survey, 39 J. DENT. CHILD. 368, 369 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Survey of Techniques];
Davis & Rombom, Survey of the Utilization of and Rationalefor Hand-over-Mouth (HOM)
and Restraint in Postdoctoral Pedodontic Education, I PEDIATR. DENT. 87, 88 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Davis & Rombom]; Levy & Domoto, Current Techniques for Behavior Management, a Survey, I PEDIATR. DENT. 160, 161 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Levy & Domoto].
For a description of HOM see infra text accompanying notes 5-14.
3. See Heifer, Patient Management Techniques in Pediatrics- Past, Present, and
Future, in MANAGEMENT OF CHILDREN BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, A SYMPOSIUM 7 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Heifer]; Lenchner & Wright, NonpharmacotherapeuticApproaches to
Behavior Management, BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT IN DENTISTRY FOR CHILDREN 103 (G.Z.
Wright ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Lenchner & Wright]; MacGregor, PracticalSuggestions on Child Management, 48 NEW ZEALAND DENT. J. 102, 105 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
MacGregor]; Miller, Legal Issues Involved in Child Management, MANAGEMENT OF CHILDREN By HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, A SYMPOSIUM 18, 20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Miller];
Ripa, Management of Children's Disruptive Behaviors, in MANAGEMENT OF DENTAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN 84 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ripa]; Williams & Clark, Securing Cooperationfrom the Child Dental Patient, 43 J. DENT. CHILD. 416, 418 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

doubts concerning their legal liability for battery should a parent object to the use of HOM with a child.'
The purpose of this article is to analyze whether the proper use
of HOM will expose the dentist to legal liability for battery or malpractice. To date there have been no reported cases of legal actions
by patients against dentists who have used HOM. This article, then,
first explores the possible legal grounds on which a dentist may base
his or her belief that the use of HOM is legal. The article then suggests which legal grounds will likely be accepted by the courts.
II.

Description of HOM

The HOM technique has been explained in several dental journals and textbooks.' To ensure legality of the treatment, the dentists'
adherence to the description of HOM, as stated in the dental literature, is absolutely essential, and any departure from the proper application of HOM may expose the dentist to warranted liability.
The proper application of HOM has been described as follows:
The child is placed firmly in the dental chair. If the child flails his
arms and legs, the dentist and dental auxiliary will restrain the child
to prevent self-harm and damage to the dental staff and equipment.
If the dentist cannot communicate with the child because the child is
screaming and crying, the dentist may then place his hand over the
child's mouth to stifle the noise. Simultaneously the dentist says
calmly and firmly, but without anger, "You must stop crying. You
are not allowed to cry in here. We want to look at your teeth." Usually the child will stop screaming, crying, and flailing at this point.
Immediately the dentist should reinforce the child's good behavior
with praise, by saying, "I knew you were a good helper," or "I knew
you could sit still." 6
Properly done, HOM is a procedure that disrupts maladaptive
Williams & Clark].
4. See Braham, supra note 1, at 333; Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89; Levitas,
HOME - Hand Over Mouth Exercise, 41 J. DENT. CHILD. 178, 181 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Levitas].
5. BRAUER, supra note 1, at 53-54; S.B. FINN, CLINICAL PEDODONTICS 44 (4th ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as FINN]; W.C. MCBRIDE, JUVENILE DENTISTRY 31-32 (4th ed. 1945)
[hereinafter cited as McBRIDE]; Braham, supra note 1, at 333; Craig, Hand-over-mouth
Technique, 38 J. DENT. CHILD. 387, 387-88 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Craig]; Lenchner &
Wright, supra note 3, at 105-06; Levitas, supra note 4, at 180-81: Martinez, Sax, & Elsbach,
Managing the Crying Child Patient, 47 J. DENT. CHILD. 329, 331-32 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Martinez]; Ripa, supra note 3, at 82-84; Rombom, Behavioral Techniques in Pedodontics,
the Hand-over-mouth Technique, 48 J. DENT. CHILD. 208, 209 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Rombom].
6. See BRAUER, supra note 1, at 53-56; FINN, supra note 5, at 44; MCBRIDE, supra
note 5, at 31-32; Braham, supra note 1, at 333; Craig, supra note 5, at 387-388; Lampshire,
supra note 1, at 514; Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 105-06; Levitas, supra note 4, at
180-81; Martinez, supra note 5, at 331-32; Ripa, supra note 3, at 82-84; Rombom, supra note
5, at 209.

learning, 7 thus, HOM is not for every child.8 For example, HOM
may not be the best technique for obtaining cooperation from a child
who is physically or emotionally handicapped or too young to communicate with the dentist.' For the child who resists treatment by
resorting to temper tantrums, hysteria, or aggression, HOM is an
effective method for obtaining the child's cooperation in the current
treatment and in subsequent treatments.1"
HOM is not intended to be punitive in nature." The dentist is
not attempting to modify the child's behavior by creating an unpleasant situation that the child wishes to terminate. Instead, the
dentist, through proper use of HOM, is communicating to the child
that the child's avoidance tactics will be useless and unnecessary. 2
If the child's unacceptable behavior continues when the dentist's
hand is removed, and if additional applications of HOM are unsuccessful in establishing communication between the dentist and the
child, the child's airway is closed by placing a hand over the mouth
with the thumb and forefinger lightly closing the nostrils.13 The nostrils are closed no longer than fifteen seconds. 4 For use in this article, this technique will be designated HOMAR - hand-over-mouth
with airway restricted. If the child now decides to cooperate, the
dentist should remove his hand immediately and praise the child for
his good behavior.
7. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 88; Rombom, supra note 5, at 209.
8. See MCBRIDE, supra note 5, at 32; FINN, supra note 5, at 44; Braham, supra note
1,at 333; Craig, supra note 5, at 388-89; Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89, 90; Lampshire, supra note 1,at 515; Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 104; Wright, Patient Managerent Techniques in Pedodontics - Past, Present, and Future, MANAGEMENT OF CHILDREN BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, A SYMPOSIUM 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
9. See Craig, supra note 5, at 389; Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 104; Levitas,
supra note 4, at 179; Survey of Attitudes, supra note 2, at 247-48; Survey of Techniques,
supra note 2, at 369.
10. See BRAUER, supra note 1, at 54-55; FINN, supra note 5, at 44-45; McBRIDE,
supra note 5, at 30-31; Craig, supra note 5, at 24; Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 88;
Lampshire, supra note 1, at 515; Levitas, supra note 4, at 179; Survey of Attitudes, supra
note 2, at 247; Survey of Techniques, supra note 2, at 369. But see Levy & Domoto, supra
note 2, at 163.
I1. FINN, supra note 5, at 44; Craig, supra note 5, at 389; Davis & Rombom, supra
note 2, at 89; Lampshire, supra note 1,at 514; Rombom, supra note 5, at 209-210. But Cf.
Levy & Domoto, supra note 2, at 163; Williams & Clark, supra note 3, at 418. For a discussion of HOM as a nonpunitive behavior management technique see infra text accompanying
notes 49-75.
12. Craig, supra note 5, at 388; Levitas, supra note 4, at 180. See also MCBRIDE,
supra note 5, at 31 ("to break down the iron will of an incorrigible patient"); Rombom, supra
note 5, at 210 ("to discriminate the dental setting as not being a suitable place for that particular avoida nce-response").
13. Braham, supra note 1,at 333; Craig, supra note 5, at 387; Lenchner & Wright,
supra note 3, at 107.
14. Martinez, supra note 5, at 331. One authority recommends holding the nostrils
closed for "about 5 to 10 seconds." BRAUER, supra note 1,at 54. Cf. Braham, supra note 1, at
333 (briefly closing off the nostrils); Craig, supra note 5, at 387, 388 (for a few seconds);
Lampshire, supra note 1, at 514 (for a short period of time); Lenchner & Wright, supra note
3, at 107.

HOMAR may succeed when HOM has not because the child is
uncomfortable with his airway restricted. 5 This comfort-level difference between HOMAR and HOM, however, will subject HOMAR
to greater legal scrutiny. HOMAR more nearly approaches an aversive procedure - punishment for misbehavior - than does HOM.
Nevertheless, both HOM and HOMAR disrupt maladaptive learning by communicating to the child that the child's avoidance tactics
are unnecessary and useless.16
III.

Bases of Legality of HOM and HOMAR

The dentist may attempt to justify the use of HOM and
HOMAR on any of three 7 legal bases: first, the parent expressly
consented to the dentist's using HOM or HOMAR; second, the parent impliedly consented to the dentist's treating the child with HOM
or HOMAR, which is an inseparable part of the child's dental treatment; third, the parent gave informed consent to the dentist's using
HOM or HOMAR, although its use was not disclosed prior to the
treatment, because the dentist was justified or excused from disclosing its use. These three bases of justification or excuse are considered
separately.
A.

Express Consent to HOM or HOMAR

A battery is an unprivileged touching of another person's
body.' 8 A dentist will commit a battery if, for example, he extracts a
patient's tooth without obtaining the patient's consent to the extrac15. See Heifer, supra note 3, at 7.
16. Craig, supra note 5, at 388; Levitas, supra note 4, at 180; see also McBRIDE,
supra note 5, at 31 ("to break down the iron will of an incorrigible patient"); Rombom, supra
note 5, at 210 ("to discriminate the dental setting as not being a suitable place for that particular avoidance-response").
17. Arguably, there is a fourth basis justifying or excusing a dentist's use of HOM.
Morris writes that in certain instances, the dentist may be justified in administering mild corporal punishment to a child under the theory that the dentist stands in loco parentis. W.O.
MORRIS, DENTAL LITIGATION 33 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as MORRIS (2d ed.)]. Properly administered HOM is not corporal punishment. For a discussion of HOM as a nonpunitive behavior management technique see infra text accompanying notes 49-74. Yet more importantly to this discussion, a dentist does not stand in loco parentis. One who stands in loco
parentis is one taking on himself the obligations of a parent and assuming the financial burdens arising out of the relationship of parent and child. E.g., Stirrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463,
470 n.3, 305 N.E. 2d 877, 882 n.3 (1974); Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 210,
61 N.E. 961, 962 (1901). Teachers have been held to stand in loco parentis to a limited
extent, because teachers have a social duty to teach all children, including the disruptive child
and the child whose education is being disrupted by the misbehaving child. E.g., Marlar v.
Bill, 181 Tenn. 100, 102, 178 S.W.2d 634, 635 (1944). Dentists possess no social or legal
obligation to treat all children. MORRIS, DENTAL LITIGATION 5 (1972)

[hereinafter referred to

as MORRIS (1st ed.)]. Hence, a dentist may not use in loco parentis as a legal grounds for
using HOM or HOMAR.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 (1979); MORRIS (2d ed.), supra note 17,
at 27; W.L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 34 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].

tion. 19 Patient consent to the dentist's touching of the patient's body
will eliminate the commission of a battery.2" Consent should be precise.2 1 For example, if a patient consents to the extraction of a molar, that does not grant the dentist permission to extract an incisor.22
Yet, if the patient with full knowledge of all the normal, serious risks
of a treatment consents to its use, the patient cannot later object that
the dentist has committed a battery. 3
The safest course for a dentist employing HOM or HOMAR,
then, is to obtain parental consent in advance of the treatment. 24 Obtaining such express consent would require an explanation of the
technique and the normal, serious risks associated with its use.25 If
the parent agrees that the dentist may use HOM or HOMAR, the
parent and the child may not object subsequent to its proper use.2"
The parent may argue successfully, however, that the dentist exceeded the limits of the agreed upon procedure 27 or that the dentist
performed HOM or HOMAR improperly or negligently.28 But the
dentist need not fear liability when he acts skillfully and carefully
and within the limits agreed upon by the parent.
For several reasons, obtaining express parental consent for
HOM or HOMAR prior to its use will not be practicable or desira19. E.g., Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa. Super. 192, 195, 163 A. 341, 342 (1932).
20. Carr v. Dickey, 163 Cal. App. 2d 416, 423, 329 P.2d 539, 544 (1958); Morris (2d
ed.), supra note 17, at 27.
21. E.g., Morre v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. App. 1961) (patient's signing
consent form granting dentist power to decide necessary treatment held not consent to extraction of all patient's teeth).
22. See, e.g., Carr v. Dickey, 163 Cal. App.2d at 418, 329 P.2d at 540 (1958).
23. Watkins v. Parpala, 2 Wash. App. 484, 490-91, 469 P.2d 974, 979 (1970); Morganstern, Informed Consent - the Doctrine Evolves, 93 J. AM. DENT. Assoc. 634, 642 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Morganstern].
24. Miller, supra note 3, at 19, 20; see also, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123
(D.C. Cir. 1941); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514
(1972); MORRIS (2d ed.), supra note 17, at 29; Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89.
25. E.g., Watkins v. Parpala, 2 Wash. App. at 490-91, 469 P.2d at 979; Morganstern,
supra note 23, at 642.
26. MORRIS (2d ed.), supra note 17, at 27.
27. See, e.g., Carr v. Dickey, 163 Cal. App.2d at 418, 329 P.2d at 540.
28. Generally, a health professional is bound to possess and exercise at least the average degree of skill possessed and exercised by members of his profession in his locality. E.g.,
Schillinger v. Savage, 186 Ind. 189, 191, 115 N.E. 321, 322 (1917). For a specialist, such as a
pedodontist, the degree of skill and care is that of those who devote special attention to the
ailment, agreeable with the state of scientific knowledge at the time of treatment, in similar
localities generally. Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 628, 110 N.E.2d 337, 339 (1953); see
also Bassett v. Glock, 174 Ind. App. 439, 444, 368 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1977). Gradually, the
locality rule is being abrogated, and in its place is being substituted a broader geographical
standard.
A qualified . . . dental practitioner should be subject to liability, in an action for
negligence, if he fails to exercise that degree of care and skill which is expected
of the average practitioner in the class to which he belongs, acting in the same
or similar circumstances. The standard of care is that established in an area
coextensive with the medical and professional means available in those centers
that are readily accessible for appropriate treatment of the patient.
Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash.2d 73, 79, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967).

ble. For example, the explanation of HOM, its effects, and alternatives is a difficult and time consuming task.2 9 Also, the description of
HOM may cause the parent to reject irrationally its use with the
child,30 and to select as an alternative to HOM a more dangerous
child behavior management technique.3 ' Additionally, because
HOM is rarely used, prior disclosure is often unnecessary.32 A dentist cannot always predict which child will resist treatment.3 3 Then
during treatment, when the child becomes hysterical or throws a
temper tantrum, the dentist will not interrupt the treatment to avoid
partially reinforcing the maladaptive behavior.3 4
Because obtaining prior consent to the use of HOM and
HOMAR may be impracticable or undesirable, some dentists recommend procuring prior parental consent to the use of physical restraints. 35 For example, the dentist may inform the parent, "I may
have to hold Mickey down or strap him down," and the parent may
reply, "That is all right with me." It is unlikely that such consent
expressly encompasses the use of HOM or HOMAR. A parent's
conception of physical restraints may include strapping the child
down, wrapping the child, and holding arms and legs, but would usually exclude placing a hand over the child's mouth and restricting
the child's airway. Therefore, express parental consent to physical
restraints will not likely justify a dentist's use of HOM or HOMAR.
Some dentists recommend disclosure of the use of HOM or
HOMAR after the treatment."6 While subsequent disclosure may
have practical legal significance by deterring a parent from suing
and preventing a child from fabricating a child abuse story,3 7 it is
not a substitute for prior consent. The battery, if any, has been committed and no explanation will erase it.
29. An explanation of HOM, its effects, and alternatives to HOM and their effects
would be nearly as long as this article. But see Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89. "[A]
brief discussion with the child's parents is advisable. Simple terminology explaining both what
may be done and the reason for utilizing the techniques is adequate." Id.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 128-29.
31. Chambers, Managing the Anxieties of Dental Patients, 37 J. DENT. CHILD. 363,
366 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Chambers]; Craig, supra note 5, at 389; Wright, supra note
8, at 5; R.W. Aubuchon, Premedication of Child Patient with AIphaprodine Nisentil 12-24
(October 28, 1977) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Aubuchon].
32. HOM is the least used of all child behavior management techniques. Levy &
Domoto, supra note 2, at 161, 163; see also FINN, supra note 5, at 44 (only as a last resort);
McBRIDE, supra note 5, at 32 (only a means of last resort).
33. See Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 106.
34. Rombom, supra note 5, at 209; see also Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 88.
"[ilt is harder to break a child of a habit which is only occasionally successful in avoiding a
fear event than of a habit which has been successful every time it was used. . . . Behaviorists
have shown that behavior which is partially reinforced is more resistant to extinction." Chambers, supra note 31, at 28 (emphasis in original).
35. Levitas, supra note 4, at 181.
36. McBRIDE, supra note 5, at 32.
37. Id.

B.

Implied Consent to the Use of HOM or HOMAR

Whenever a patient seeks treatment from a dentist he impliedly
consents to certain touchings of his body. 38 For example, although
the patient never tells a dentist that the dentist may touch the patient's teeth with an explorer, the dentist will not be liable for battery, if the dentist does so. The patient has consented impliedly to
the touching of his teeth with an explorer.
When the patient has consented to a treatment, and the dentist
has performed it as skillfully and carefully as a prudent dentist in
the same locality would, the patient cannot later claim that he has
not consented to the manner in which the dentist has provided the
treatment.3 9 For example, the patient who has consented to having
an extraction cannot complain that the dentist has extracted the
tooth improperly, merely because the patient would have extracted
the tooth differently. The dentist is not judged according to the patient's standard, but according to the standards of the dental
professional. 40
Likewise, when a parent seeks dental treatment for a child, the
parent impliedly consents to the dentist's use of ordinary, acceptable
dental techniques and procedures for providing the agreed-upon
treatment. HOM is included among acceptable dental techniques
and procedures. Ninety-one percent of the members of the American
Academy of Pedodontics surveyed in March 1980 used HOM with
appropriate children in all or selected cases.4 1 Generally, members
used HOM with children aged three to nine who were throwing temper tantrums, showing aggression, resisting treatment, or exhibiting
hysteria.42 In 1979, a survey by Davis and Rombom revealed that
HOM was taught by eighty-nine percent of the American postdoctoral pedodontic programs. 43 Eighty-three percent of these programs
recommended HOM for hysterical, tantrum behavior." In addition,
numerous textbooks and articles advocate the use of HOM.' 5
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1979); PROSSER, supra note 18, at
101-03.
39. "The law does not insist that a surgeon shall perform every operation according to
plans and specifications approved in advance by the patient, and carefully tucked away in his
office safe for courtroom purposes." Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1943).
40. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash.2d 73, 79, 431 P.2d 973, 978 (1967); Worster v.
Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 627, 110 N.E.2d 337, 339 (1953); Schillinger v. Savage, 186 Ind. 189,
191, 115 N.E. 321, 322 (1917).
41. Survey of Attitudes, supra note 2, at 247, 248; see also Survey of Techniques,
supra note 2, at 369 (96 of 120 respondents used HOM).
42. Survey of Attitudes, supra note 2, at 247, 248; see also Survey of Techniques,
supra note 2, at 369 (children throwing temper tantrums, showing aggression, resisting treatment, or exhibiting hysteria are generally from two to nine years of age).
43. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 88.
44. Id.
45. BRAUER, supra note 1, at 53-56; FINN, supra note 5, at 44-45; MCBRIDE, supra

Acceptability of HOM by the dental profession is not an absolute assurance of the legality of the technique.4 6 The law will not
allow dentists to agree to treat patients in a manner unacceptable to
our society."7 For example, if all the dentists agreed that the best
way to anesthetize a patient would be to hit the patient on the forehead with a carpenter's claw hammer, the law would obviously forbid the procedure.4 8
Unlike the wielding of a carpenter's hammer, HOM is a procedure that involves sound judgment by dentists to which the law
should defer. The use of HOM has many long term positive effects"9
and few, if any, negative effects.5" The children receive necessary
dental treatment 5 and often develop strong attachments to and affection for their dentists.5 2 Many eagerly seek dental treatment in
the future. 53 In addition to the immediate and long range positive
effects of HOM, there are few, if any, negative effects of HOM.
Physical harm is rare and limited to slight abrasions caused by the
child scratching his face, and petechia" caused by the dentist's hand
rubbing against the child's face. Postdoctoral pedodontic programs
in the United States generally agree that the negative psychological
effects of HOM are nonexistent or minimal. 55 In addition, the opinions of psychologists tend to support the use of HOM.56
The slight, if any, negative psychological impact of HOM is
placed in perspective when one appreciates that its use is a reinforcement and flooding technique, 57 not punishment. 58 HOM positively
note 5, at 31-32; Craig, supra note 5, at 387-89; Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 88-89;
Lampshire, supra note 1, at 514-15; Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 103-07; Levitas,
supra note 4, at 178-83; Rombom, supra note 5, at 209-10; Wright, supra note 8, at 5-6.
46. Cf. Miller, supra note 3, at 18.
47. Id.
48. But cf. Simone v. Sabo, 37 Cal.2d 253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951) (holding that expert
testimony is needed to establish malpractice of dentist whose untrained assistant, at request of
dentist, weilded an ordinary carpenter's hammer to aid the dentist's extraction of plaintiff's
tooth).
49. Levitas, supra note 4, at 182; see also Lampshire, supra note 1, at 515; Lenchner
& Wright, supra note 3, at 107 ("The strongest reward of all, however, is internal, i.e., when
the child has learned that he can handle his anxieties and cope with the dental environment
successfully.")
50. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 90; Wright, supra note 8, at 5; see also Finn,
supra note 5, at 45; Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 104.
51. BRAUER, supra note 1, at 54; Lampshire, supra note 1, at 515; Levitas, supra note
4, at 179.
52. BRAUER, supra note 1, at 55. But see Williams & Clark, supra note 3, at 418.
53. Id.; FINN, supra note 5, at 45. But see Levy & Domoto, supra note 2, at 163.
54. "Petechia" is defined as small purplish spots occurring on the skin, caused by hemorrhage into the cutaneous tissues. I The New Century Dictionary 1293 (H.G. Emery & K.G.
Brewster eds. 1957).
55. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 90; Lampshire, supra note 1, at 515; Lenchner
& Wright, supra note 3, at 104; Wright, supra note 8, at 5.
56. Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 104; Wright, supra note 8, at 5; see also
Chambers, supra note 31, at 366-70.
57. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89, 90; Rombom, supra note 5, at 209.

reinforces the child's good behavior through the dentist's praise for
the child's cooperation, 9 Although some may characterize HOM as
punishment,60 such characterization is generally incorrect. 1 Punishment is a behavior modification technique that makes a behavioral
response less likely to occur. 2 The punishment does not actually
eliminate the behavior.6 3 It simply suppresses the behavior while the
punishing agent is present.6 1 Once the punishing agent is removed,
however, the punished behavior is likely to reappear.65 When HOM
is used, most children's maladaptive behavior is extinguished for
both present and prospective dental treatment. 66 This extinction
partly is due to the positive reinforcement component of HOM,6 7 but
chiefly is due to the flooding aspect of HOM. 8
Flooding is a behavior modification technique that eliminates a
child's attempts to avoid a perceived undesirable situation by directly
exposing the child to that situation." Through exposure to the perceived undesirable situation and discovery that there is nothing undesirable about it, the child learns that there is no reason for him to
attempt to avoid the situation."0 After flooding has extinguished the
child's maladaptive behavior, the child willingly subjects himself to
the situation.7 1
58. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89; Lampshire, supra note 1, at 515; Rombon,
supra note 5, at 209. But see Levy & Domoto, supra note 2, at 163; cf. Heifer, supra note 3,
at 7 (holding of hands over child's mouth may be perceived as suffocation by the child).
59. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89; Lampshire, supra note 1, at 514; Lenchner
& Wright, supra note 3, at 107. For examples of the positive reinforcement component of
HOM see BRAUER, supra note 1, at 54; Levitas, supra note 4, at 181.
60. Lenchner & Wright, supra note 2, at 105; Levy & Domoto, supra note 2, at 1630;
f. Heifer, supra note 3, at 7.
61. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 105; Rombom, supra note 5, at 210.
62. W.E. CRAIGHEAD, A.E. KAZDIN, & M.J. MAHONEY, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION:
PRINCIPLES, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS 118-19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CRAIGHEAD];
A.o. Ross, CHILD BEHAVIOR THERAPY: PRINCIPLES, PROCEDURES, AND EMPIRICAL BASIS 13
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Ross, CHILD BEHAVIOR THERAPY]; A.O. Ross, PSYCHOLOGICAL
DISORDERS OF CHILDREN: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO THEORY, RESEARCH, AND THERAPY
47 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Ross, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS]; Chambers, supra note 31,
at 371.
63. Chambers, supra note 31, at 371; Ross, Defiant Behavior, in MANUAL OF CHILD
PSYCHOLOGY 903 (B.B. Wolman ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Ross, Defiant Behavior].
64. Chambers, supra note 31, at 371; Ross, Defiant Behavior, supra note 63, at 903.
65. Id.
66. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89; see also Rombom, supra note 5, at 209,
210.
67. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2 at 89; Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 107.
68. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89; Rombom, supra note 5, at 209.
69. CRAIGHEAD, supra note 62, at 197; R. McAULEY & P. MCAULEY, CHILD BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT 91 (1978); T. MILLON, MODERN
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: A BIOSOCIAL APPROACH TO MALADAPTIVE LEARNING AND FUNCTIONING 592 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MILLON]; Ross, CHILD BEHAVIOR THERAPY, supra note
62, at 263.
70. MILLON, supra note 69, at 592; cf. Chambers, supra note 31, at 270.
71. MILLON, supra note 69, at 592; cf. Chambers, supra note 31, at 270. But cf. Ross,
CHILD BEHAVIOR THERAPY, supra note 62, at 263 (flooding rarely used with children because
the cure may be worse then the disease).

Properly used, HOM is a flooding technique.72 It requires the
child to withstand the feared event of dental treatment.7" The child
is treated and discovers that his reasons for avoiding treatment were
unfounded in fact."' Thereafter, the child willingly seeks dental
75
treatment and the psychological impact on the child is positive.
In addition, HOM is superior to other child management techniques, including the use of premedication, parental discipline, and
relative analgesia.7 6 Premedication merely postpones the child's
chance of facing his anxiety and managing it. 77 A premedicated
child never realizes that his undesirable coping strategies are not
necessary or useful. 7" The child upon whom HOM has been employed is made aware that these undesirable strategies are useless. 79
72. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89; Rombom, supra note 5, at 209.
73. Id.
74. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89; Levitas, supra note 4, at 182; Rombom,
supra note 5, at 209, 210. But see Levy & Domoto, supra note 2, at 163; cf. Rombom, supra
note 5, at 210 (stating that it would be instructive to follow up on children who have been
exposed to HOM to determine whether the use of HOM affects a child's future behavior in the
dental office and future willingness to seek dental care).
75. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 90; see also Lampshire, supra note 1, at 515
(strengthens the child's personality); Lenchner & Wright, supra note 7, at 107 (child has
learned he can handle his anxieties and cope successfully with the dental environment). But
see Williams & Clark, supra note 3, at 418 (child experiences such insult and fear that his
self-image is affected). For the rare child for whom the proper use of HOM does not achieve
its intended result - the extinction of the maladaptive behavior - HOM may be characterized as nonpainful punishment. There is no inconsistency here. It is impossible to speak of
universal reinforcers, punishers, or extinguishers. The effect of a given behavior therapy must
be ascertained on each occasion with each child. Often a presumed reward turns out to be a
punisher and what was thought to be a punishment turns out to be a reward. Ross, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS, supra note 62, at 47-48.
The importance of the prior paragraph's discussion of HOM as a possible punishment in
relatively few situations where it is properly used is this: A dentist can use HOM properly, yet
slightly punish the child in doing so. Levy & Domoto, supra note 2, at 163; Williams & Clark,
supra note 3, at 418. But see Rombom, supra note 5, at 210 (HOM is punishment only when
applied with excessive force). The existence of a punishment consequence of HOM, however, is
unpredictable. This unpredictability must require that the dentist not be held liable for battery
or malpractice merely because in some relatively rare situation one may characterize use of
HOM as punishment. In addition, the mere fact that a child has been punished does not
indicate that the child has suffered pain or any injury. A punisher is defined simply as a
consequence that weakens a response. CRAIGHEAD, supra note 62, at 118-19; Ross, CHILD
BEHAVIOR THERAPY, supra note 62, at 13; Ross, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS, supra note 62,
at 47. In addition, properly used, HOM is not a pain-inducing technique, as the descriptions of
its use clearly indicate. See authorities cited supra note 5. Whether one characterizes HOM as
a punisher, as opposed to a reinforcer or an extinguisher, the child is likely to have little, if
any, negative physical or psychological damage. See authorities cited supra note 50. And
when, as is true in nearly every case, the use of HOM has its normal effect of extinguishing
the child's maladaptive behavior, the psychological impact on the child is positive. See also
supra notes 49, 51-53.
76. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 88; Levitas, supra note 4, at 182; see Chambers, supra note 31, at 366.
77. Chambers, supra note 31, at 366; see also Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 88.
In addition, the use of premedication may establish a dangerous rationale for prospective drug
abuse. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 88.
78. Chambers, supra note 31, at 366.
79. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 89; Levitas, supra note 4, at 180, 182;
Rombom, supra note 5, at 210; see also Chambers, supra note 31, at 366.

In addition, premedication is far more dangerous than the use of
HOM. 80 There are always contraindications and side effects of
drugs. 8 ' Furthermore, while some premedications have caused fatalities,82 no child has died from the use of HOM.
Soliciting parental discipline of the child gives the dentist only
an illusion of control over the child.8 When the parent disciplines
the child, or threatens him, the child cooperates with the dentist
merely to terminate the punishment, the parental discipline or threat
of discipline.8 4 The child is not managing his behavior positively.
When the parent is not available, the avoidance behavior returns.85
Such avoidance behavior ultimately may be manifested in the child
not seeking dental care when he becomes an adult.86 The proper use
of HOM, by contrast, teaches the child that misbehavior is not tolerated and is not necessary or useful in the dental office - a lesson
that is not forgotten.87
Other child management techniques are not alternatives to
HOM. 88 Relative analgesia requires patient cooperation. 9 General
anesthesia is recommended only after nonpharmacological strategy
has been exhausted and sedation has been unsuccessful. 9 0 It is a last
resort. 91
The parent, by seeking treatment of a child, consents to the
dentist's use of ordinary dental techniques in order to enable the
dentist to provide the agreed upon treatment.9 2 HOM is an inseparable part of the treatment of the child who resists treatment. Without
the use of HOM or some other child management technique that is
as professionally acceptable as HOM,9 3 the dentist's examination
and care of the child's teeth are impossible.9 4 Simply because a den80.

Aubuchon, supra note 31, at 12-24; D. Taylor, Letter to Editor, 41 J.

DENT.

CHILD. 257 (1974).

81.

BRAUER, supra note 1, at 57; Aubuchon, supra note 31, at 5-6.
82. Aubuchon, supra note 31, at 3, 13-17, 20-22, & 24.
83. Chambers, supra note 31, at 372. Generally, superior child treatment results occur
when the parent is absent during the child's treatment. Chambers, Behavior Management
Techniques for Pediatric Dentists: An Embarrasment of Riches, 44 J. DENT. CHILD. 30, 31
(1977).
84. Chambers, supra note 31, at 272; Ross, Defiant Behavior, supra note 63, at 903.
85. Chambers, supra note 31, at 272; cf. Ross, Defiant Behavior, supra note 63, at 903.
86. Cf. Chambers, supra note 31, at 272.
87. See supra note 12.
88. See Wright, supra note 8, at 5. Without HOM many children would be subjected
needlessly to heavy sedation or general anesthesia. Id.
89. CRAIG, supra note 5, at 389.
90. See Wright, supra note 8, at 5.
91. Cf. id at 6. If pedodontists abandon some child management techniques commonly
used today, dentistry performed under general anesthesia, which carries with it a higher risk
factor, will increase. Id.
92. CRAIG, supra note 5, at 389; Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 104.
93. See, e.g., Levitas, supra note 4, at 182 (those who use premedication, nitrous oxide,
or general anesthesia are looking for the easy way out).
94. FINN, supra note 5, at 43; Levitas, supra note 4, at 179; Rombom, supra note 5, at

tist rarely encounters a child for whom HOM is appropriate does not
alter the fact that use of HOM is an ordinary technique for the
treatment of that child.95 No advance express consent to HOM
should be necessary after consent to treatment of the child has been
obtained. 6
The legal basis - the acceptability of the technique to the ordinarily prudent dentist in the locality - is the firmest foundation,
short of express consent, on which the dentist may rest his belief in
the legality of using HOM. It must be stressed, however, that strict
adherence to the professionally acceptable description of HOM is essential9" and that its use should be restricted only to those patients
with whom the profession has sanctioned its use. 98
The use of HOMAR is legally more suspect than the use of
HOM because of the perceived harshness of closing the child's airway. 99 HOMAR is not as highly acceptable to the dental profession
as HOM. 0 0 A majority, fifty-four percent, of the members of the
American Academy of Pedodontics uses HOMAR in selected
cases.' 0' Nonetheless, only thirty percent of the postdoctoral
pedodontics programs recommend the use of HOMAR. 1 2 The lower
acceptance rate by itself is no bar to the legitimacy of the use of
HOMAR without prior express parental consent. It is not required
that all dentists or that even a majority of dentists subscribe to a
particular treatment.' 0 3 The legal objection to the use of HOMAR
without prior express consent, if any, will rest on the perceived severity of the remedy for the child's misbehavior: closing the airway. Unlike HOM, which is a reinforcement and flooding technique and is
rarely punitive, HOMAR may be viewed as including a punishment
component.'0 The child wants to behave, not merely because he has
learned that his maladaptive behavior is unnecessary, but also be208.
95. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. But see Miller, supra note 3, at 18.
96. CRAIG, supra note 5, at 389; Lenchner & Wright, supra note 3, at 104.
97. HOM may create a dental phobia if the dentist employing HOM does so in an
especially punitive or vicious manner or fails to verbalize appropriately to the child. Davis &
Rombom, supra note 2, at 90. Departure from the professional acceptable description of HOM
will impose liability on the dentist for malpractice, i.e., failing to meet the standard of the
dental profession. See supra note 28.
98. For the type of patient with whom HOM's use is recommended see supra note 42
and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 7-9, 44.
99. Helfer, supra note 3, at 7 (child may perceive suffocation).
100. E.g., Ripa, supra note 3, at 84 (HOMAR should never be used).
101. Survey of Attitudes, supra note 2, at 247, 248.
102. Davis & Rombom, supra note 2, at 88.
103. E.g., DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 545, 173 A.2d 333, 337 (1961); Board of
Med. Regis. & Exam. of Ind. v. Kaadt, 255 Ind. 625, 629, 76 N.E.2d 669, 672 (1948); MORRIS (Ist ed.), supra note 17, at 82; McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners 12
VAND. L. REV. 549, 565 (1959); see also O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir.
1971).
104. See Heifer, supra note 3, at 7; Williams & Clark, supra note 3, at 418.

cause he wants to terminate an adverse condition. The child does not
want his oxygen supply cut off."0 5
In reviewing the use of HOMAR on a child by a dentist, a
judge will try to empathize with the child. He will attempt to understand what the child felt when the dentist restricted the child's oxygen supply. This empathy may lead the court to conclude that
HOMAR is too extreme a touching to be spared judicial condemnation solely because of professional acceptability.
There are factors that mitigate the perceived harmful effects of
HOMAR. The same positive psychological effects associated with
HOM are present with HOMAR. 01° The child becomes an ideal patient and will continue to seek necessary dental care. 11 7 There is reason to believe that the most affectionate and cooperative children are
those with whom the dentist has used HOMAR. 1°8 Yet these factors
may not sway the scales of justice to the side of the dentist using
HOMAR without prior express parental consent.
C. Nondisclosure of Use of HOM or HOMAR Justified or Excused. Informed Consent
Although the use of HOM is an ordinary, acceptable dental
procedure for treating certain children, and need not be disclosed
when the parent has consented to the dentist's treatment of the
child, 109 the parent may attempt to argue that he has not given informed consent to the treatment. The parent may contend that the
dentist had not disclosed all the elements of the treatment that the
parent considered important in his decision to consent to the treatment of the child. 1 10 The parent is not likely to succeed with the
argument that informed consent is lacking, however, because nondisclosure of the use of HOM is justified or excused."'
105. Heifer, supra note 3, at 7.
106. See BRAUER, supra note 1, at 54-55; Lampshire, supra note 1, at 514-15; Lenchner
& Wright, supra note 3, at 106-07.
107. BRAUER, supra note 1, at 54-55; Lampshire, supra note 1, at 515; Lenchner &
Wright, supra note 3, at 106-07.
108. BRAUER, supra note I, at 55.
109. See supra notes 38-98 and accompanying text.
110. The informed consent doctrine was formally recognized in the 1950's and 1960's.
E.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 317 P.2d
170 (1957); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d II (Mo. App. 1960), reh'g denied, 360
S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1962).
There is considerable debate whether the doctrine of informed consent is grounded in
battery or malpractice. E.g., Comment, Informed Consent in Pennsylvania - The Need for a
Negligence Standard, 28 VILL. L. REV. 149 (1982). Most jurisdictions recognize informed
consent as a malpractice concept. Id. at 152. For informed consent as a battery concept see,
e.g., Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971). For informed consent as
grounded in malpractice see, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1972).
Ill. But see Miller, supra note 3, at 18.

A dentist owes the duty to the patient to make a reasonable
disclosure of material facts relevant to the patient's decision.1 12
There are three judicial views of informed consent, which concern
the scope of information a dentist must disclose to a patient prior to
the commencement of treatment. The first two views are nearly identical. The dentist's duty to disclose either is measured by the customary disclosure practices of dentists, 13 or is measured by what a reasonable dentist would disclose under similar circumstances." 4 A
majority of the courts that have considered the issue adopt one of
these two views, which primarily make disclosure a professional decision."" The third view is that the duty to disclose is measured by the
patient's need for information that is material to the patient's decision whether to accept or reject treatment.11 The courts adopting
the third view are not in agreement whether an objective test or a
subjective test should be applied to informed consent cases. 7
112. E.g.. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. at 404, 350 P.2d at 1104; Mitchell v. Robinson,
334 S.W.2d at 18.
113. E.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, Ill Ariz. 542, 534 P.2d 1052 (1975); DiFillippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627
(1963); Ross v. Hodges, 234 So.2d 905 (Miss. 1970).
114. E.g., Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970); Miceikis v. Field, 37
Ill. App.3d 763, 347 N.E.2d 320 (1976); Charley v. Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 528 P.2d 1205
(1974); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980); Negaard v. Feda's Estate, 152
Mont. 47, 446 P.2d 436 (1968); Petterson v. Lynch, 59 Misc.2d 469, 299 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup.
Ct. 1969); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976).
115. "The duty of the physician to disclose . . .is limited to those disclosures which a
reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances. How the
physician may best discharge his obligation to the patient . . . involves primarily a question of
medical judgment." Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. at 409, 350 P.2d at 1106 (emphasis added).
116. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Hales v. Pittman, 118 Ariz. 305, 576 P.2d 493 (1978); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229,
502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Goodwin v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 294 So.2d 618
(La. App.), cert. denied, 299 So.2d 788 (La. 1974); Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 489
P.2d 953 (1971); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Keogan v. Holy
Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246 (1980).
The inquiry is not . . .primarily a medical one. The duty to warn should be
based not only on the doctor's practice, but on the patient's needs; that is, the
inquiry should be whether a reasonable man in the doctor's position and with his
knowledge of the patient would have been justified in concluding with substantial certainty that the plaintiff, if informed of this risk, would not have withdrawn consent.
Note, Physicians and Surgeons, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1445, 1447 (1962).
The duty to warn and to advise of alternatives does not arise from and is not
limited by custom of physicians in the locality. Rather, it exists as a matter of
law if (I) the risk of injury inherent in the treatment ismaterial; (2) there are
feasible alternative courses available; and (3) the plaintiff can be advised of the
risks and alternatives without detriment to his well-being.
Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. at 179, 489 P.2d at 957.
117. MORRIS (2d ed.), supra note 17, at 37. For the subjective test see, e.g., Goodwin v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 294 So.2d at 620 ("to allow the patient to form a basis of an
intelligent consent"). For the objective test see, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502
P.2d at 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16 ("a prudent person in the patient's position").

IV.

Jurisdictional Treatment of Informed Consent

A. Jurisdictions Following the First and Second Views of Informed Consent
Unquestionably, the use of HOM and HOMAR is a customary
dental practice and a technique a reasonable dentist may use."" It is
also irrefutable that because it is a customary dental practice not to
inform the parent of the prospective use of HOM or HOMAR, a
reasonable dentist does not disclose its prospective use. 9 Hence, for
dentists practicing in jurisdictions that subscribe to the majority view
of informed consent there can be no liability for failing to disclose
the use of HOM or HOMAR.
B.

Jurisdictions Following the Third View of Informed Consent

Our inquiry into the legality of the nondisclosure of the use of
HOM or HOMAR must not stop after examining what customary
dental practice is or what a reasonable dentist discloses. Increasingly, courts that previously deferred to the dental professional are
adopting the third view of informed consent. Under this view, a denmatetist must disclose the risks a reasonable patient would 2consider
0
rial to his decision whether to accept the treatment.1
Materiality is the keystone of a dentist's duty to disclose under
the third view of informed consent.' 2 ' If the reasonable patient
would consider the omitted risk essential to his decision to seek treatment, the dentist by failing to disclose the risk has committed malpractice. 22 If the risk is not material, then the dentist is excused
from disclosing the risk.' 23 In addition, proximate cause is necessary
in any malpractice case.' 24 There must be a causal relation between
the dentist's failure to inform and the injury to the patient. 2 5 No
proximate cause exists if the patient would have submitted to treat118. See supra notes 41-45 & 99-103 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. See also BRAUER supra note I, at
53-54;McBRIDE, supra note 5, at 31-32; Lampshire, supra note 1,at 514-15; Levitas, supra
note 4, at 181.
120. See supra note 116.
121. MORRIS (2d ed.) supra note 17, at 42; Note, The Florida Medical Malpractice Act
of 1975, 4 FLA. ST. L. REV. 50, 70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Fla. Malpractice Act);
Note, Cooper v. Roberts: A "Reasonable Plaintiff" Test for Informed Consent, 34 U. PITT. L.
REV. 500, 501 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Informed Consent].
122. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16;
Note, Fla. Malpractice Act, supra note 121, at 70; Note, Informed Consent, supra note 121,
at 501; Note, Physicians and Surgeons, 75 HARV. L. REV. at 1447.
123. E.g., Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. 174, 179, 489 P.2d 953, 956 (1971).
124. E.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 11,104 Cal. Rptr. at 515;
Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Medical Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 1038 (Ind. App.), reh'g. denied,
424 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802 (1982).
125. Id.

ment, even if full disclosure had been made." 6
Circumstances sometimes exist that permit the dentist to omit
disclosure of the risk for therapeutic reasons. 2 7 For example, the patient's emotional condition may be such that full disclosure would
seriously complicate or hinder the treatment."' In other cases, the
patient might justifiably be considered incapable of coping with the
knowledge of the potential dangers and likely to distort them in such
a way that a rational decision would be impossible." 9 In such circumstances, withholding or limiting disclosure seems justified.' a The
dentist cannot withhold disclosure, however, merely because the patient on learning the risks might rationally decline treatment.' 31
The dentist's nondisclosure of his prospective use of HOM may
be justified or excused for two reasons. First, the risk associated with
the use of HOM is not material to the reasonable parent. Last, a
parent irrationally would deny the dentist's use of HOM with a
child.
The risk of using HOM is not material, because there are no
normal, serious risks associated with its use. 1 32 The risk of physical
injury is nearly nonexistent and the risk of negative psychological
effects is nominal or zero.' 3a In fact, the opinion of psychologists
tends to support the use of HOM.' 4
In addition, it is more likely that advance disclosure of the use
of HOM can retard the child's acceptance of any dental treatment.
A dentist reinforces a child's feeling that it is possible to resist and
to avoid treatment when the child becomes unruly before or during
treatment and the dentist seeks parental consent to use HOM. 35 By
126. Id.
127. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788-89; Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii at
191, 473 P.2d at 119; Watkins v. Parpala, 2 Wash. App. at 492, 469 P.2d at 979; Note,
Informed Consent, supra note 121, at 506; Note, Physicians and Surgeons, 75 HARV. L. REV.
at 1448; see also Lund, The Doctor, the Patient and the Truth, 19 TENN. L. REv. 344, 348
(1946); Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosisfrom PlaintiffSick with
Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REV. 349, 351 (1946).
128. Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628,
641-43 (1970); Note, Physicians & Surgeons, 75 HARV. L. REV. at 1448.
129. Note, Physicians and Surgeons, 75 HARV. L. REV. at 1448.
130. Id.
131. Id.; Note, Informed Consent, supra note 121, at 506. It is doubtful whether a patient is required to make a rational decision. Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking,
1979 Wis. L. REV. 413, 421 n.38 (1979); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 790 ("a
patient is free to decide for any reason that appeals to him"). But see In re President &
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 331
F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (court refused to honor decision of
Jehovah's Witness to refuse life-saving blood transfusion); Comment, Unauthorized Rendition
of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 860 (1965).
132. See supra notes 49-75 and accompanying text.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 34.

relenting or compromising, the dentist partially reinforces undesirable behavior.13 It has long been known that partially reinforced
misbehavior is more resistant to extinction that fully reinforced behavior. 13 7 Proper child behavior management, therefore, dictates that
treatment not be interrupted in order to seek parental consent to
38

HOM.1

The imprudence of seeking consent during treatment, however,
does not excuse seeking consent before treatment. One such excuse is
provided by proving that the risk associated with the treatment is
immaterial.1 39 The immateriality of the risk associated with the use
of HOM was proved above. 4 ' The second justification for omitting
disclosure before treatment is that a parent would act irrationally,
when informed of the prospective use of HOM, and deny its use.""
This second excuse has doubtful legal acceptability.' 42 In addition,
although a parent who is only briefly informed of HOM may unjustifiably object to its use, a parent to whom the dentist has fully explained the procedures and risks of HOM and the procedures and
risks of premedication and other child management alternatives
should be able to decide rationally whether to consent to the dentist's
use of HOM.
A rational parental decision to refuse treatment of the child
may be harmful to the child.' 3 Courts and legislatures have created
medical rights for children that allow health professionals to select
appropriate treatments for children despite parental objection to the
treatments and consent to alternative treatments.1 44 Parental denial
of the use of HOM may be such a treatment. The child is subjected
to fewer risks and will have better dental health when HOM is used
rather than premedication, relative analgesia, and general anesthetics.' 4 5 Whether the expectation of rational parental objection to a
136. Id.
137. Chambers, supra note 31, at 372.
138. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
139. E.g., Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Ore. at 178, 489 P.2d at 956.
140. See supra notes 49-75, 132-34 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 131. "The physician's privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed, however, for otherwise it might devour the
disclosure rule itself." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 789. Any doubts concerning the
[dentist's] privilege [to withhold information from the patient] should be decided in favor of
the patient's autonomy." Comment, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Patient Participation in Medical Decisionmaking, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 172, 181-82 (1981).
143. [Tihe parental right to control a child's nurture is grounded not in any 'absolute
...
Custody of a
property right "which can be enforced to the detriment of the child.
Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 747, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (1978).
144. E.g., Va. Code Sec. 54-325.2 (1982); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379
N.E.2d 1053. But see In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936
(1979) (upholding parental decision to have child's cancer treated with laetrile, not by
radiation).
145. See supra notes 76-82, 88-91 and accompanying text.

treatment that is best for the child excuses disclosure of the objectionable treatment is not currently known. This expectation is unlikely to excuse disclosure, however, since most of the cases permitting treatment despite parental objection are concerned with child
patients who suffer serious illnesses
or injuries that left untreated
146
will result in death to the child.
Nevertheless, the immateriality of the risk of HOM excuses the
dentist's nondisclosure of its use. 147 In addition, the low risk of harm
and high probability of positive effects connected with the use of
HOM compels the conclusion that the reasonable parent to whom
HOM and its alternatives have been explained would accept the dentist's treatment of the child. Hence, the disclosure of the use of
HOM is unnecessary for informed consent to the treatment of the
child.14
It is more difficult under the third judicial view of informed consent to determine whether a parent has given informed consent to
the child's treatment when the prospective use of HOMAR is undisclosed. Due to the perceived extremity of closing the airway,"' a
court may rule that the reasonable parent would consider its disclosure an essential factor in deciding whether to agree to the treatment
of the child, even though it appears that the physical and psychological impact of HOMAR is not significantly different from that of
HOM. 15 ° In fact, as was stated earlier, HOMAR may have a greater
positive psychological impact on children than HOM. 1 1 Additionally, like the disclosure of HOM, the disclosure of HOMAR may
lead the parent to deny treatment of the child or to seek dental treatment in which premedication or another riskier child behavior management procedure is used. 52 Moreover, the child may have a legal
right to be treated with HOMAR despite parental objection to it.1 53
Nevertheless, a dentist's use of HOMAR without prior parental consent has dubious legality in jurisdictions adopting the third view of
informed consent.
V.

Conclusion

The objective of this article has been to delineate the possible
legal grounds upon which a dentist may base his use of HOM or
146. E.g., Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (child with
leukemia); see Comment, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 860 (1965).
147. But see Miller, supra note 3, at 18.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 76-82, 88-91 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.

HOMAR for child behavior management. The use of HOM will not
subject the dentist to liability to the patient when HOM is used
properly and parental consent to treat the child is obtained. This parental consent need not specifically identify the prospective use of
HOM, because HOM is an inseparable component of the treatment
of certain children. Parental consent to the treatment is informed
consent to the necessary use of HOM. The use of HOMAR is more
objectionable legally and may result in liability of the dentist practicing in some jurisdictions, unless express parental consent to its use
is obtained in advance of treatment.
Because no reported decision of any court has indicated the legal standing of the use of HOM or HOMAR, it is hoped that this
article may be of some guidance to courts faced with the issue of the
legality of a dentist's use of HOM or HOMAR. Until a court rules
on the legitimacy of the use of HOM or HOMAR, there will be
some uncertainty about how a court will view its use. Clearly, the
dentist cannot avoid liability if the dentist utilizes HOM or
HOMAR in a manner inconsistent with the standard of the dental
profession. Yet despite such uncertainty, the dentist who uses HOM
or HOMAR in accordance with the standard of the ordinarily prudent dentist in the locality and who obtains the requisite consent to
treatment should not fear liability for battery or for malpractice.

